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GRAHAM v. COMMONWEALTH
250 Va. 79,459 S.E.2d 97 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
During the early morning hours, Sheryl L. Stack and Edward Martin
were seated in Stack's car in a restaurant parking lot when Andre L.
Graham approached the car.1 Graham had a gun and told them to get out
of the vehicle. Graham told Martin to hand over his wallet and car keys
to Graham's unarmed companion. While Graham held the gun on Stack
and Martin, the other man entered Martin's car. Graham told Stack and
Martin to lie down on the parking lot and close their eyes. Both victims
were shot in the head as they lay on the ground.2
Stack never regained consciousness and died some time later in the
hospital. Although Martin had been shot in the head and suffered
extensive brain injuries, he survived and was able to testify.3 He stated
that although he did not remember how long after he closed his eyes that
he was shot, Graham was the last person he saw with a gun.
4
At trial it was discovered that the Commonwealth had withheld
exculpatory evidence thatMartin, the surviving witness, had misidentified
Graham's accomplice in a photo array. Graham used this uncovered
evidence in the cross-examination of Martin, but did not immediately
object upon learning of the evidence that his due process rights had been
violated by the Commonwealth's withholding of this information.
5 The
trial court rejected Graham's proffered jury instructions regarding eye-
witness testimony. 6 Graham was convicted of capital murder7 and
sentenced to death.8
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia held, inter alia,9 that the trial court
did not err in rejecting Graham's proffered instruction on eyewitness
identification and that Graham waived any alleged Brady errors by not
seeking a mistrial or other remedy upon his discovery of undisclosed
evidence during cross-examination of a Commonwealth witness.1 0
1 Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 83, 459 S.E.2d 97, 99
(1995).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 82, 459 S.E.2d 99.
4 Id. at 83, 459 S.E.2d 99.
5 Id. at 87,459 S.E.2d 101.
6 Id. at 86,459 S.E.2d 100.
7 Id. at 80, 459 S.E.2d 97. Graham was also convicted of seven other
offenses including one charge of attempted robbery, two charges of
robbery and malicious wounding, and four charges of the threatening use
and display of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Id. at 80-81,
459 S.E.2d 97-98.
8 Id. at 81,459 S.E.2d 98.
9 The court rejected some of the defendant's assignments of error
in brief, conclusive language. The rulings provide little if any guidance
because they apply broad, settled principles of law to facts that are
specific to the case being reviewed. Issues in this category that will not
be addressed in this summary include: (1) failure to guide the jury's
discretion in its consideration of the "vileness" and "future dangerous-
ness" aggravating factors; (2) use of evidence of prior convictions to
impose the sentence of death constitutes double jeopardy; (3) the death
penalty, per se, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under current
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
L Jury Instruction on Eyewitness Identification
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the circuit court did
not err in refusing to give Graham's proposed instruction on eyewitness
testimony. 1 Graham described his proffered jury instruction as a "cau-
tionary eyewitness identification instruction." 12 This instruction would
have directed the jury to consider certain common-sense factors in
assessing the credibility of Martin's eyewitness testimony, such as: (1)
the witness's ability to see, hear, or know the things about which the
witness testified; (2) how well the witness was able to recall and describe
those things; (3) the witness's manner while testifying; (4) whether the
witness had any interest in the outcome of the case or any bias or
prejudice concerning any party or any matter involved in the case; (5) the
reasonableness of the witness's testimony considered in light of all the
evidence in the case; and (6) whether the witness's testimony was
contradicted by what that witness has said or done at another time, or by
the testimony of other witnesses, or by other evidence.
13
The Supreme Court of Virginia had rejected a similar claim in
Satcher v. Commonwealth. 14 In Satcher, the court had held that since the
jury was fully instructed on the presumption of innocence and reasonable
doubt, a separate instruction on identity was not required. 15 Because
Graham's jury had been fully instructed on the presumption of inno-
cence, the Commonwealth's burden ofprovingguiltbeyond areasonable
doubt, the consideration of circumstantial evidence, and the assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the court
found that the proposed instruction was not required, and that the trial
court did not err in refusing to grant it.
16
In United States v. Holley,17 the Fourth Circuit prospectively
adopted a rule that in cases that contain no evidence of identification
except the eyewitness testimony of one witness, the trial judge should
standards of decency; (4) failure to give adequate jury instructions on
mitigation, use of model jury instructions, and jury verdict forms inhibit
the jury from giving independent weight to aspects of the defendant's
character and record and to circumstances of the offense that are
proffered in mitigation; (5) failure of Virginia to provide for meaningful
appellate review deprives the defendant of statutory rights and due
process of law; (6) whether the Commonwealth had a duty to negate
Graham's hypothesis that he was not the trigger man, given the lack of
any evidence to support Graham's hypothesis; and (7) whether Graham's
death sentence was excessive or disproportionate. Id. at 84-85, 459
S.E.2d at 100.
10 Id. at 87-88,459 S.E.2d at 101.
ll Id.
12 Id. at 86,459 S.E.2d at 100.
13 Id. at 86,459 S.E.2d at 100-101.
14 Id. at 87,459 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Satcher v. Commonwealth,




17 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974).
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give the jury instructions on the assessment of eyewitness identification
evidence. 18 The Fourth Circuit announced that it would "view with grave
concern the failure to give the substantial equivalent of such an instruc-
tion .... ,19 The court found that in Holley, "the identification testimony
... was so lacking in positiveness as to strongly suggest the 'likelihood
of irreparable misidentification[.]' '. 20 Therefore, "the jury should have
been specifically instructed to consider thepossibility ofmisidentification
under the specific circumstances revealed by the evidence."
'21
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Holley provides a clear example to
present to a trial court of when other courts have found eyewitness
instructions to be desirable. 22 Indeed, at least one court has found that
such an instruction in certain circumstances is constitutionally re-
quired. 23
In United States v.Brooks,24 the Fourth Circuit held that defendants
are not entitled to such an instruction in every case where there is
significant identification testimony. Such a cautionary instruction is
required only where evidence in the case strongly suggests the likelihood
of irreparable misidentification. 25 Therefore, when faced with a trial
court's denial of such an instruction, attorneys should continue to object
on the record based on a violation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to due process.
IH. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
Graham also argued that the Commonwealth violated the trial
court's order to disclose all exculpatory evidence prior to trial.
26 The
alleged exculpatory evidence was Martin's misidentification of the other
man present at the scene when presented with a photographic spread of
six suspects. This misidentification occurred at the same time Martin
picked Graham from another photographic spread. 27 Prior to trial, the
Commonwealth advised Graham only that Martin was unable to identify
the other man.
28
18 Id. at 275 (citing UnitedStates v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552,555, n.5
(D.C.Cir. 1972)).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 276 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968)).
21 Id.
22 See also United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Scott, 578 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975); and People v. Wright, 755 P.2d
1049 (Ca. 1988).
23 State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
24 928 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir. 1991).
Graham "learned of Martin's misidentification during his cross-
examination of one of the Commonwealth's witnesses, [but] he failed to
bring the matter to the court's attention at that time by way of a motion
for mistrial, a motion for a continuance, or a request for other relief.
Instead, he used the fact of Martin's misidentification to his own
advantage in his argument to the jury and raised theBrady issue only after
the jury returned an adverse verdict."29
Graham claimed that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose this
exculpatory evidence deprived him of the due process rights articulated
in Brady v. Maryland.30 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
concluded that Graham had waived his Brady claim and thus the court
would not consider Graham's contention that the trial court erred in
refusing to set the verdicts aside and grant a new trial.
3 1
Graham makes clear that defense attorneys must raise any Brady
violation to the court immediately upon discovery. This may require the
defense, when discovering the Brady violation during cross-examina-
tion, to make its objection before continuing with the cross-examination.
Graham certainly requires the defense to make its objection before the
verdict is rendered and the guilt phase is concluded.
Defense objections based on Brady should be stated in terms of the
defendant's right to due process and should be carefully constructed to
fully explain the prejudice incurred. As noted in Kyles v. Whitley,32 the
undisclosed Brady evidence should be evaluated in light of the potential
cumulative effect of the evidence.33 Attorneys should note that this may
include the cumulative effect that the undisclosed evidence might tend to
have on any evidence already adduced at trial.
Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica
25 Id. at 1407.




30 Id. (citing 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
31 Id.
32 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). See case summary of Kyles, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
33 Id. at 1560.
